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An ordinance encouraging government entities to purchase locally grown food by providing local producers a bid preference depending on whether the producer is local, sustainable, or a combination of both.
This policy brief addresses arguments facing university endowments on whether or not to divest from fossil fuel companies. From the advocates of divestment, endowments hear about the serious environmental damage already incurred, the frightening trajectory of the math and the benefit from taking a public stance on a critical ethical issue. From the skeptics they hear that screening will adversely affect risk and return and that the goal of any endowment should be to focus exclusively on returns. The math shown in Tables 1 and 2 does support the skeptics\' view that screening negatively affects a portfolio\'s risk and return, but it also shows that the impact may be far less significant than presumed. It\'s beyond the scope of this paper to judge whether endowments should implement or avoid screening, but anyone on an endowment board facing that decision should at least do the math, in this case the investment math.
This ordinance is a three strikes and you\\\\\\\'re out ordinance. It applies to all corporations that want to do business in the township, and also applies to corporations already doing business in the township. The ordinance prevents any corporation from doing business in the township if it has a history of consistent violations with regards to environmental regulations. Consistent violations, as defined by the Wayne Township Supervisors, is three violations over the past fifteen years. The term violations is broadly defined within the Ordinance, and includes Notices of Violation, court proceedings, and any violation of state, local, or federal statutory or regulatory law. Compliance violations include violations committed by the corporation, and the corporation\\\\\\\'s parent, subsidiaries, directors and offers and owners, and other corporations served by the directors and officers. If a corporation applies for any permit or permission from the township, that corporation is required to furnish these compliance histories if the township has reason to believe that the corporation has noncompliance history. This reason to believe is triggered by a citizen petition section, which allows Township residents to submit information to the Township to trigger the request. This requirement also applies to corporations already doing business in the Township -although this is a portion of the Ordinance that will probably be subjected to a legal challenge.
This ordinance creates the Chicago Infrastructure Trust. The trust is a public-private partnership that uses private investments to pay for public infrastructure projects. The Trust is a non-profit organization that will provide funding and credit support to qualifying city infrastructure projects, attract private investments for these infrastructure project, make grants to qualifying projects, and provide transparency with the infrastructure funding process. The ordinance also creates a board of directors and determines the composition and powers of the board.
This ordinance establishes a public purchasing preference for locally-produced goods. This ordinance requires that government and public agencies review their existing purchasing contracts to evaluate the portion of their purchasing portfolios that are produced locally. Moreover, this ordinance establishes purchasing standards and practices that apply to any future contracts entered into by the county or its agents.
This report explores disclosure practices for certain types of subsidies per locality and provides a grade for those programs based on the quality of company-specific disclosures. The report finds that two-thirds of the economic development subsidy programs run by the nation\\\'s largest cities and counties do not use the web to report which companies are receiving the tax breaks and other forms of financial assistance. Among the third of programs that do practice online transparency, most do so poorly, failing to disclose the dollar value of the subsidies. An even smaller number reveal key outcomes such as how many jobs were created.
An ordinance requiring that planned superstores complete an economic impact analysis before seeking approval for their projects, giving community members and elected officials more control over these development projects.
This ordinance encourages the government to procure goods through local businesses with price preferences. Small businesses (those with 35 or fewer employees) receive a 5% price preference in the awarding of city contracts. For services provided through a request-for-proposal process, local small businesses receive a 10% point advantage. Local businesses of all sizes also receive a 2.5% preference, but the city defines a \\\'local\\\' business as any business with a location in Santa Clara County.
This report discusses the concept, features, and implementation of municipal-level community benefits agreements (CBAs) in California. This report notes that these agreements enhance trust and cooperation between employees, businesses, communities, and governments by contractually binding them to one another following CBA negotiations. Notably, where large scale development projects are bound to a community through a CBA, this report finds that the economic growth and development is more wide spread across the community where developers and communities have a CBA in place than in cases where developers are not bound to the community through some contract. This report finds that CBAs both open lines of communication between community groups and developers and foster greater coordination between communities and developers by establishing goals of development.
The resolution requires Woodbury County and any food service contractors who conduct business with the county to purchase locally produced organic food when a department of Woodbury County serves food in the usual course of business. A contractor may cover unavailable local organic supply through its current procurement practices with preference to be given to local non-organic food products. The resolution requires a single-point-of-contact broker, located in Woodbury County, to interact with food service contractors, for availability, price, quality, presentation and delivery terms for all locally produced organic food.